Montana Law Review
Volume 59
Issue 2 Summer 1998

Article 3

July 1998

The Taxation of Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injury Cases
Brent B. Nicholson
Associate Professor, Department of Legal Studies, Bowling Green State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Brent B. Nicholson, The Taxation of Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injury Cases, 59 Mont. L. Rev.
(1998).
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Nicholson: The Taxation of Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injury Cases

THE TAXATION OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN
PERSONAL INJURY CASES
Brent B. Nicholson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, which excludes from taxation payments made on account of personal
injury or sickness, has been the scene of some significant activity
in recent years. Major legislative work was done in 1982, 1989,
and, most dramatically, in 1996. Supreme Court involvement has
occurred in 1992, 1995, and late 1996. While all this activity has
clarified some aspects of the exclusion, one of the issues that has
yet to be definitively resolved is whether prejudgment interest on
personal injury payments retains its taxable character as interest or whether it takes on the exclusionary coloring of damages
paid on account of a personal injury or sickness.
This article, after examining the necessary background matters, discusses three relevant appellate court decisions, one from
the Tenth Circuit and two from the First Circuit, rendered in
1996. Although the First Circuit still considers the issue open,
the Tenth Circuit has ruled prejudgment interest to be taxable.
The Sixth Circuit, without opinion, has also affirmed a Tax
Court determination of taxability. The article then continues
with an analytical section explaining why, in the author's opinion, the Internal Revenue Service is likely to prevail in future
cases on the issue. A short concluding section ends the article.
II. BACKGROUND
A The Relevant Code Provisions
Any analysis of an issue relating to §104(a)(2) of the Internal
Revenue Code (the "Code") must necessarily begin not there, but
with §61(a). 1 That provision, which defines the term "gross income," brings within its reach income from whatever source
derived, unless specifically excluded.2 In other words, unless
* Associate Professor, Department of Legal Studies, Bowling Green State University. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor Doug Chapman of
the University of Toledo College of Law for his helpful comments and observations
on this and other tax issues.
1. See I.R.C. § 104(aX2) (1994); I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994). Section 61(a) provides, in
pertinent part, 'Leixcept as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means
all income from whatever source derived .

2.

. . ."

I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994).

In full relevant part the section provides, "Except as otherwise provided in
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otherwise excluded, all income is gross income, the genesis of
taxability. The taxpayer has the burden of demonstrating to the
Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") and, if need be, the courts,
why a particular item of income is not subject to tax-the presumption is otherwise.3 Section 61(a) continues with a non-exhaustive list of specific items that are included in gross income.
Near the top of the list is interest.4
The specific exclusion relevant to this article is contained in
§104(a)(2). This recently amended subsection now removes from
gross income the amount of damages received "on account of'
personal physical injury or sickness.5 Such amounts are excluded, whether obtained by lawsuit or settlement agreement.6 The
subsection was amended by the Periodic Payment Settlement Act
of 1982 ("PPSA") to clarify that the exclusion was equally applicable to lump sums or structured settlement payments.7 Regulations promulgated under the provision specify that the exclusion
is only available for claims based on tort or tort-type rights.8
Judicial gloss has restricted the exclusion to natural persons.9
Litigation in the 1990s involving §104(a)(2) has focused most

this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived
I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994).
3. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328 (1995); United States
v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233 (1992); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S.
426, 430 (1955); Forest v. Commissioner, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87062 (1st Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision); Delaney v. Commissioner, 99 F.3d. 20, 23 (1st Cir.
1996); Brabson v. United States, 73 F.3d 1040, 1042 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S.Ct. 607 (1996); Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894, 898 (5th Cir. 1995).
4. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (1994).
5.
I.R.C. § 104(aX2) (1994) (as amended). Prior to August 21, 1996, §104(aX2)
read as follows:
(a) In GENERAL. Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in
excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc.,
expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include-..
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on
account of personal injuries or sickness.
Effective generally for amounts received after August 20, 1996, subsection (2) was
amended to read as follows:
(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages)
received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums
or as periodic payments) on account of personal physical injuries
or physical sickness.
6. See I.R.C. § 104(aX2) (1994).
7. See Periodic Payment Settlement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat.
2605 (1983).
8. See Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970).
9. See P&X Markets, Inc. v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 441, 444-45 (1996); Boyett
Coffee Co. v. United States, 775 F. Supp. 1001, 1003-04 (W.D. Tex. 1991).
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prominently on two issues: the taxability of Title VII and Age
Discrimination Employment Act ("ADEA") discrimination payments and the taxability of punitive damages. Three U.S. Supreme Court decisions between 1992 and 199610 and statutory
changes in 1989 and 1996 have clarified these issues to a significant extent, but not entirely." The 1996 legislation has, in fact,
created some new issues which will be discussed in this article.
After this series of explications and changes, the state of the
law is fundamentally as follows:
1. The Commissioner v. Schleier 12 Supreme Court decision
rendered in June, 1995, provides that in determining the taxability of a personal injury payment a two prong test must be employed.'" In order to meet the requirement for tax exclusion,
both prongs must be satisfied. First, the underlying cause of action must be based on a tort or tort-type right.14 That prong is
directly in sync with the Treasury Department regulation. 5 In
fact, prior to Schleier, many thought that was the beginning and
end of the inquiry, including Justices O'Connor, Souter and
Thomas."6 In Schleier, however, a majority of the Court said
that the tort requirement was not coterminous with the personal
injury requirement." Thus, the second prong of the test for
excludability was that the payment must be "on account of" a
personal injury. 8 ADEA payments failed both tests, according
to the Court. 9 Because the ADEA did not compensate for things
like pain and suffering and emotional distress, i.e., traditional
tort-type injuries, the claim was not based on tort or tort-type

10. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996) (punitive damages);
Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995) (ADEA payments); United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992) (Title VII payments).
11. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, §1605,
110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (1996); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-239, §7641, 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989).
12. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
13. See id. at 333-34.
14. See id.
15. See id.; see also, Treas. Reg. §1.104-1(c) (1994) (providing in pertinent part
"[tihe term 'damages received'.. . means an amount received . . . through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort-type rights ....
").
16. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 338, 344-46. Referring to the Burke decision Justice O'Connor said, "Every Member of the Court so understood the opinion--that the
scope of §104(aX2) is defined in terms of traditional tort principles... the IRS
regulation is 'descriptive of the ambit of §104(aX2) as a whole.' " Id. at 344 (internal
citations omitted).
17. See id. at 333.
18. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 333-34.
19. See id. at 330-31.
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rights (therefore, failing the first prong).2' Further, neither the
backpay nor liquidated damage awards were paid on account of a
personal injury (therefore, failing the second prong).21 Backpay
was not "linked" to a personal injury-being laid off because of
age, for example, was not a personal injury or sickness t --and
liquidated damages were found to be punitive in nature and
hence paid on account of reprehensible behavior, not on account
of a personal injury.'m
As a result of the 1996 legislation, the only personal injury
payments now excludable are those for physical personal injury
or sickness.' Congress explicitly stated that emotional distress
is excluded from taxation payments only if it is a direct consequence of either physical injury or sickness.'m This physical/nonphysical distinction for compensatory damages is generally effective for amounts received after August 20, 19 9 6.' Thus, discrimination awards, for example, are taxable, although an argument may be made that amounts received for sexual harassment
based on a physical contact or touching are excludable. The
House Ways and Means Committee Report indicates that payments made on account of physical injury to another, such as in
loss of consortium and wrongful death cases, are excludable."
2. Punitive damage awards are generally taxable.' Legislation in 1989 made punitives paid on account of nonphysical personal injuries taxable.' 9 The Supreme Court decision in O'Gilvie
20.
See id. at 334-36. This was true, said the Court, even though, unlike Title
VII as construed in Burke, the ADEA provided for jury trials and punitive damages.
See id. at 335. Since Burke, Title VII has been amended to give a more expansive
array of remedies and allow for jury trials. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. Although the amendment occurred before Burke was decided, Burke involved the pre-amendment version of Title VII. See Burke, 504 U.S. at
237, n.8.
21.
See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330-32.
22.
See id. at 330.
23.
See id. at 331-32, n.5 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111 (1985)).
24. See I.R.C. §104(aX2) (1994) (amended by 26 U.S.C.A. § 104(a)(2) (West
Supp. 1998).
25. See I.R.C. §104(aX2) (1994) (amended by 26 U.S.C.A. § 104(a) (West Supp.
1998).
26. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, §
1605(dX1), 110 Stat. 1755, 1839. The 1996 amendments do not apply to amounts
received under written binding agreements, court decrees, or mediation awards in
effect on (or issued on or before) September 13, 1995.
27. See H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 143-44 (1996).
28. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, §
1605(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 1838.
29. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, §
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dictated the same treatment for punitives paid on account of
physical personal injuries." The Small Business Job Protection
Act of 1996 confirmed this tax status prospectively. The only
exception provided in the bill is for punitive damages paid in
states where, in wrongful death actions, the only damages available are punitive damages.31 Such state laws must have been in
effect as of September 13, 1995.32 Noted author and practitioner
Robert Wood has raised the intriguing question of whether punitive damages will be imputed in an otherwise silent settlement
agreement reached after a judgment which contained a punitive
damage component.' This is one of the issues created by or remaining after the 1996 legislation.
B. The Nature of PrejudgmentInterest
"Prejudgment interest is interest which is awarded in the
judgment but which is calculated to begin accruing at some time
before judgment is entered."' Although not traditionally available at common law, the award of prejudgment interest is becoming more common as a means of encouraging settlements, as
well as for compensating plaintiffs and removing earnings from
defendants earned with money not belonging to them.35 Pre-

judgment interest on personal injury awards was not typically
awarded because, at least as regards the nonpecuniary portion of
such awards (pain, suffering, mental anguish), the amount was
considered unliquidated and noncompensatory."
Several states have by statute or judicial decision mandated
prejudgment interest for some or all types of cases.37 In other
states, the grant of such interest is discretionary with the
court." The starting point for accrual also varies from state to
state, with some starting from the date of injury, some from the
date of filing of the complaint, and some from the time of first

7641, 103 Stat. 2106, 2379.
30. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 452, 453 (1996).
31. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, §
1605(c), 110 Stat. 1755, 1838.
32. See id. at 1838-39.
33. See Tax Analysts' Taxation of Damages Discussion Group, Damage Awards
Update 97-2 (visited January 28, 1997) <httpJ/www.tax.org/notes/tadiscus/3672.htm>.
34.
1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.6(1), at 335 (2d ed. 1993).
35. See id. § 3.6(3), at 254 and § 8.4, at 454.
36. See id. § 8.4, at 454-56.
37. See id. at 457, 460.
38. See id. at 460.
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demand, among others. s9 The source of the interest rate utilized
may be the judgment rate, a special rate designated for prejudgment interest or a market rate.4 ° At common law, the interest
was computed as simple interest, a position still adopted by some
states today.41 Others provide for compounding.4 2 Remarkably,
even in states that statutorily provide for prejudgment interest
these computational issues may not be addressed.43
C. Pre-1996Law Regarding Prejudgment Interest
Congress has never directly considered the issue of taxing
prejudgment interest." The taxpayers in Brabson v. United
States made the argument that an inference of Congressional
intent regarding it could be made from its treatment of periodic
payments under the PPSA.45 That legislation specified that the
entire amount of the payments received in a structured settlement were excludable even though each payment implicitly contained an interest component." The taxpayers argued that this
evidenced a Congressional decision that interest on personal
injury damages was excludable. 47 The Brabson court found the
argument unpersuasive." The court's "read" was that Congress
merely sought to relieve taxpayers of the difficulty of segregating
the interest and principal components from each payment and
did not intend any general inference about the taxability of interest.49 Given the ease with which such segregation could be accomplished, the court's view seems equally dubious."
39. See id. at 457.
40. See id. at 458-59.
41.
See id. at 459.
42. See id. at 459-60.
43.
See id. at 460.
44. See Brabson v. United States, 73 F.3d 1040, 1045 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 607 (1996).
45. See id. at 1045-46 n.5.
46. See Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 101, 96 Stat. 2605 (1983).
47. See Brabson, 73 F.3d at 1045-46 n.5.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 72(b) (1998) (providing an exclusion ratio for annuity payments. That exclusion ratio is expressed by the formula: investment amount/total
expected return X annuity amount. Similarly, the amount of a structured settlement
could have an exclusion ratio expressed as: personal injury award/total expected receipts X amount received. For example, plaintiff receives a $100,000 award and
agrees to accept, instead of a lump sum payment, $15,000 per year for 10 years.
Each year the plaintiff would exclude $10,000 from gross income ($100,000/$150,000
X $15,000). Such a scheme requires that the parties agree to the liquidated amount
being deferred ($100,000 in the example)).
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Actually, Congress may have been attempting to encourage
structured settlements. If recipients of periodic payments had to
await deferral of their payments and pay tax on the imputed
interest, they would be in the same (or worse) position as a recipient of a lump sum that invested their award and paid taxes
on the earnings, assuming other factors were the same. Congress
thereby encouraged structured settlements specifically and settlements in general, by allowing the recipient of the periodic
payments to receive the payments tax free. Structured settlements were especially popular in the early 1980s because high
interest rates allowed investment of comparatively small sums to
fund the deferred payout. Conversely, the current arrangement
can be said to either favor structured settlements or penalize
lump sum payments. By excluding the entire structured settlement amount, the law clearly gives its recipient an advantage.
The most significant recent case on the taxation of prejudgment interest is Kovacs v. Commissioner." Kovacs concerned
statutory prejudgment interest on a Michigan wrongful death
award. It was decided after the Supreme Court decision in Burke
but before its decision in Schleier. The Tax Court majority took a
rather literal approach to the issue of whether the interest was
taxable. It held that "damages" and "interest" were not synony-2
mous and that only damages were mentioned in §104(a)(2).1
The 10th Circuit would later criticize this rather simplistic approach by pointing out that "wage compensation" was also different from "damages," yet clearly lost wages were an excludable
component of personal injury damages.53 The Kovacs court also
noted that the interest the taxpayers received on the award fell
under a separate Michigan statutory provision, rather than the
wrongful death provision, which the court felt buttressed their
view that the concepts of interest and damages were different."
Finally, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayers' argument that
the PPSA evidenced a Congressional intent to not tax prejudgment interest. 5 The court construed the PPSA purposes narrowly.5" Admitting that its decision arguably created some in100 T.C. 124 (1993), affd, without published opinion, 25 F.3d 1048 (6th Cir.
51.
1994) (unpublished table decision), and cert. denied, 513 U.S. 963 (1994).
52. See Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 128-30.
53. See Brabson, 73 F.3d at 1045.
54. See Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 130-31.
55. See id. at 132-33.
56. See id. at 132, (citing S. REP. No. 97-646 (1982), 1983-1 C.B. 514-15). The
court reasoned that the narrow purpose of the Act was to codify existing IRS treatment of periodic settlement payments. The IRS had excluded similar amounts in
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consistency between a situation like the Kovacs' and that of
someone receiving periodic settlement payments, the court stated
that such problems were in Congress' domain to remedy.57
The majority opinion invoked vigorous and lengthy dissents
from Judges Halpern and Beghe. Judge Halpern argued that the
PPSA intended to create consistent treatment between amounts
paid in a lump sum and those paid periodically. 8 He viewed the
majority position as creating a "patent inconsistency" between
the two types of payments.59 Interestingly, although the
Schleier Supreme Court decision was over a year away, Judge
Halpern demonstrated his prescience by viewing §104(a)(2) as
requiring payments to be based on tort or tort-type rights and on
account of a personal injury. He believed the interest component
in Kovacs failed the second test.6 Nevertheless, he believed the
interest excludable based on the intent of the PPSA. 1
Judge Beghe penned a twenty-two page dissent that hammered at multiple points. In summary fashion, his primary reasons for excluding the prejudgment interest were: (1) prejudgment interest was a form of compensatory damages and
considered as such under other provisions of the Code and Michigan law; 2 (2) exclusion was consistent with the legislative intent of the original drafters of §104(a)(2)'s predecessor (such
amounts were excluded as a restoration of lost human capital,
i.e., they merely made the plaintiff whole, as well as based on

several Revenue Rulings. Since the Kovacs were not receiving periodic payments, the
Act was not relevant, according to the court. See id.
57. See id. at 133.
58. See id. at 134-35 (Halpern, J., dissenting) (suggesting that "Congress intended to disregard any difference between the two methods of payment").
59. See id. at 137 (Halpern, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 139 (Halpern, J., dissenting) (stating that Michigan law provided
for prejudgment interest to compensate for the time value of money, to encourage
settlement, and mitigate the plaintiffs litigation expense, but not to compensate for
the personal injury).
61.
See id. (Halpern, J., dissenting).
62.
See id. at 141-50 (Beghe, J., dissenting). In this portion of his dissent,
Judge Beghe referenced two cases that were overturned and one which was modified
by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. He cited to Burke for the proposition that as
long as a payment was made based on tort or tort-like rights it was excludable. See
id. at 157. (Beghe, J., dissenting). That rule was modified by the Schleier two prong
test. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 337. Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93 (1993),
affd, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994), which held punitive damages to be excludable, was
rejected in O'Gilvie. See O'Gilvie, 117 S. Ct. at 454. The Tax Court decision cited by
Judge Beghe, Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150 (1991), was reversed by the
Seventh Circuit, Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), and the taxability of ADEA awards confirmed in Schleier. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 336-37.
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compassion for the victim);' and (3) exclusion was consistent
with the legislative intent evidenced in the total exclusion of
periodic settlement payments under §104(a)(2) and the exclusion
of life insurance proceeds of death under §101(a)." Judge Beghe
also distinguished cases cited by the majority as either involving
post-judgment interest, which he agreed was taxable, or not
involving personal injury cases." Finally, he urged his colleagues to ignore the Riddle and Aames cases to the extent they
supported inclusion in light of more recent decisions excluding
ADEA awards." The decisions cited by Judge Beghe, however,
were all effectively overruled by the Supreme Court in Schleier.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Brabson v. United States'
With this paucity of applicable case law and the lack of
legislative history, the 10th Circuit decided in favor of the taxability of prejudgment interest in January of 1996. It is the most
thorough opinion on the issue to this point.
Mary Brabson and her children were awarded personal and
property injury damages after a jury trial resulting from a gas
leak and explosion in their home.' Prejudgment interest was
automatically added to the verdict and both sums were paid to
the Brabsons by the defendants. 9 After initially paying tax deficiencies on the excluded interest, the Brabsons sought a refund
from the IRS, claiming the interest was not taxable.70 The district court agreed, finding that the interest was a component of
the personal injury damages. The government appealed.

63. See Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 150-51 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 151-53 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 154-57 (Beghe, J., dissenting). He distinguished Riddle v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.AN1339 (1933) as involving postjudgment interest. Aames v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 189 (1990) and the cases it relied on, Kieselbach v. Commissioner,
317 U.S. 399 (1943), Tiefenbrunn v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1566 (1980), Smith v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 107 (1972) and Wheeler v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 459 (1972),
all dealt with interest on condemnation awards, not personal injuries.
66. See Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 157 (Beghe, J., dissenting). Judge Beghe cited to
Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990), Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912
F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990) and Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150 (1991). See
Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 158 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
67. 73 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 607 (1996).
68. See Brabson, 73 F.3d at 1041.
69. See id. at 1041-42.
70. See id. at 1042.
71. See id. (citing Brabson v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Colo. 1994)).
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The Tenth Circuit began its opinion with several concessions, an ominous sign for the taxpayers. It conceded the general
merit of the taxpayers' argument, that the underlying claim was
based in tort (the first prong of the Schleier test) and that under
the relevant state (Colorado) law, prejudgment interest was an
element of compensatory damages.72 Unlike the district court,
however, the circuit court did not end its analysis there. The
court found that the compensatory nature of the interest under
Colorado law was related to the time value of money, not the
injury.73 The court then questioned whether such a compensatory amount was within the ambit of the §104(a)(2) exclusion as
damages paid on account of a personal injury.
In addressing that issue, the court began its analysis at the
logical starting point, the statutory language, but found no assistance there.74 It said the language provided no guidance as to
what was meant by "damages ... on account of personal injury."'75 Next, it looked to the regulations. They indicated that the
exclusion applies to amounts received based on tort or tort-type
rights.7" The court conceded that might include something like
prejudgment interest.7 7 The problem, however, was the "on account of requirement of the statute and regulation. The regulation, like the statutory language, did not definitively indicate the
meaning of that phrase.7' Lacking satisfaction with the code
and regulations, the court sought guidance in legislative history.
Once again, it found none.79 The most commonly accepted reason for the existence of §104(a)(2) was that the type of payments
covered by the provision do not represent an accession to wealth
but rather a restoration of lost human capital, i.e., the "make
whole" argument (which could include prejudgment interest).80
Despite that, the court instead focused on the fact that the issue
of prejudgment interest was not specifically considered by Congress.8 Hence, the court was on its own.
Throughout the opinion in Brabson, the court at several
points acknowledged the potential tenability of the taxpayers'

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See Brabson, 73 F.3d at 1043-44.
See id. at 1044.
See id. at 1044-45.
Id. at 1043-44.
See id. at 1045.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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arguments. The three judges admitted the merit of the arguments, conceded the compensatory nature of prejudgment interest under state law and that the taxpayers' position could even
conceivably fit within the language of the statute, the regulations and the legislative history. s2 But it was not enough. Instead, the court formulated three brief arguments in favor of
taxability.
First, the court said that prejudgment interest was not typically available in personal injury cases at the time the predecessor to §104(a)(2) was enacted in 1918.' As an argument in favor of taxability it is unpersuasive; while that may explain an
absence of discussion of the issue in the legislative history, the
court's observation does not address the substantive issue of its
taxability.
Second, "a direct link" was said to be required by Schleier
between the injury and the damages." The link between the
injury and prejudgment interest was indirect-it was time, not
injury based, said the court." In fact, however, the court's point
is only partially true. The amount of prejudgment interest a
plaintiff receives is a function of three factors. Clearly, time is
one. The others are the amount of the award, which is directly
related to the injury, and the interest rate. By focusing just on
the time component, the court was engaging in some misdirection.
Finally, and ultimately most convincingly, the court found
the interest taxable under the venerable rule of construction that
exclusions from income under the Code are to be construed narrowly." This is the corollary to the rule that "income" is to be
construed broadly. It is a useful rule for those occasions, like
Brabson, where there are credible arguments on both sides. The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on December 16,
1996.7

B. Delaney v. Commissionere
The First Circuit decision in Delaney is a case that deals

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id. at 1043-45.
See id. at 1046 and n.6.
Id. at 1046-47.
See id. at 1047.
See id.
See Brabson v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 607 (1996) (mer.).
99 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1996).
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more extensively with an issue of related significance to the
prejudgment interest issue-settlement agreement allocations-and somewhat secondarily with the issue of prejudgment
interest itself.
The basic facts of the case are straightforward. The
Delaneys were awarded $175,000 by a jury in a personal injury
case. Under the governing Rhode Island law, prejudgment interest totaling $112,000 was automatically added to the verdict.
While on appeal, the case was settled for $250,000. The settlement agreement did not mention interest at all, but a stipulation
of dismissal contained the language, "No interest. No costs."
When the Delaneys did not pay any tax on the proceeds, the IRS
treated 39 percent as prejudgment interest ($112,000/$287,000)
and taxed accordingly. The Tax Court agreed with this approach.8"
On appeal, the First Circuit was faced with two issues:
whether to allocate any of the settlement amount to interest and,
if so, whether any of that interest was taxable. Both questions
were answered affirmatively.'
The larger portion of the opinion deals with the allocation
(or lack of allocation) problem: Confirming that the Tax Court
was not bound by the mere language of the parties ("No interest.
No costs."), the circuit court endorsed the lower court's search for
the "true nature of the settlement."9 1 Curiously, the only extrinsic evidence utilized by the Tax Court to ascertain this "true
nature" mentioned by the circuit court was the self-serving statement of the Delaneys' attorney that the agreement was not tax
driven and a letter to the defendants encouraging settlement by
noting that interest was continuing to accrue on the judgment,
i.e., post judgment interest.9 2 Ultimately, it seems this issue
was decided the way it was because the IRS took a reasonable
position and the taxpayers' were unable to overcome the IRS's
presumption of correctness.93
The taxpayers fared no better in arguing that the prejudgment interest of $97,561 (39 percent of the $250,000 settlement)
was excludable from income. The First Circuit declined to hear
their attack on Kovacs (because it was not raised in the Tax

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See
See
See
See
See

Delaney, 99 F.3d at 22.
id. at 23.
id. at 24.
id. at 25.
id. at 25-26.
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Court),94 found that Rhode Island law did not consider prejudgment interest to be part of personal injury damages,95 and
refused to let them argue that the interest was nevertheless
excludable under Schleier.9 The court conceded that the first
prong of Schleier was satisfied (claim based on tort or tort-type
rights), but again asserted a failure by taxpayers to preserve on
appeal their argument that the interest was paid on account of a
personal injury.97 Significantly, the panel expressly stated that
the issue of excludability was still open.98
C. Forest v. Commissioner99
This case also involved a settlement following a jury verdict
to which prejudgment interest had been added. Like Delaney, the
case involved Rhode Island law and, also like Delaney, there was
no allocation in the settlement agreement. Apparently, tax and
interest issues were not discussed."° When the taxpayer did
not include any of her $2,000,000 settlement in taxable income,
the Service redetermined her tax by ascertaining that $560,000
of the $2,000,000 was taxable interest. ' °1 That was the difference between the settlement amount and the final judgment
award. The Tax Court would have found a greater portion of the
award to be interest but was bound by the amount in the deficiency notice.0 2
Continuing its similarity with Delaney, the taxpayer argued
first that none of the settlement amount was interest and, second, even if a portion was interest, the interest was not taxable.0 3 Here again the First Circuit upheld as reasonable the
Tax Court's determination of the interest portion." 4 The
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 27.
97. See id.
98. See id. ("As it is neither necessary nor practicable to do so in this case . . .
we do not consider whether statutory prejudgment interest may ever be excludable
from gross income under §104(a)(2), an important question left for another day.")
99. 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50, 118; 79 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 346 (1st Cir. 1996)
(unpublished opinion: First Circuit Local Rule 36.2(bX6) states unpublished opinions
may be cited only in related cases).
100.
See 79 A.F.T.R.2d 346, 347.
101.
See Forest, 79 A.F.T.R.2d at 347.
102.
See id. at 348. The Tax Court calculated the interest as $1,065,420.56
which it computed by multiplying the $2,000,000 settlement by a rate of interest of
12% per annum times the 9
years from the injury until the settlement. See id.
103.
See id. at 349.
104.
See id. at 350.
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agreement's silence allowed the Tax Court a wide-ranging freedom to look at all the facts and circumstances of the underlying
case. 5 That examination revealed a jury award and assessment of prejudgment interest both before and after a court ordered remittitur.' ° Further, the Stipulation of Dismissal indicated that the judgment "plus interest and costs" was satisfied. 0 7 Perhaps most importantly, the taxpayer offered nothing
of substance to overcome the presumptions favoring the IRS and
the Tax Court finding."8 It is noteworthy that the circuit court
did not question or discuss the Tax Court's or the IRS' method of
allocation.
Proceeding to the taxpayer's backup argument, the court
again agreed with the Tax Court in finding the prejudgment
interest taxable on the same grounds utilized in Delaney: the
taxpayer could not argue that Kovacs was a flawed decision or
argue that prejudgment interest was paid on account of her
personal injuries because these arguments were being raised on
appeal for the first time, and, also, under Rhode Island law, such
interest was not a part of personal injury damages." The
Delaney and Forest cases were easier cases for the First Circuit
than Brabson was for the Tenth Circuit because the underlying
state law in Brabson did hold prejudgment interest to be compensatory in nature.
IV.

ANALYSIS

The question of whether to tax prejudgment interest on
personal injury payments is one which does not lend itself to a
clear or easy answer. It is a question for which there are credible
arguments on both sides and for which the Code does not provide
definitive resolution or even illuminating guidance. The difficulty
of cases concerning the issue is often compounded by the involvement of payments made pursuant to settlement agreements that
do not indicate their component parts. They may arguably in-

105. See id. at 349. Importantly, though, there was no evidence of the intent of
the payor in making the payment. See id. at 350. That has been cited in several
cases as being of some importance. See, e.g., Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C.
116, 127, affd in part, rev'd in part, 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 83 (1996); Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1961); Metzger v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834, 847-48 (1987), aftd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988); Fono
v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680, 696 (1982), affd, 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984).
106. See Forest, 79 A.F.T.R.2d at 349.
107. See id. at 350.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 351.
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clude settlement of both tort and non-tort claims, and punitive
damages as well as prejudgment interest. As the Delaney and
Forest cases indicate, the first task for the court may be to determine if prejudgment interest is even involved. Specifying the
allocation of settlement payments is a matter which should be
addressed by the plaintiffs tax and litigation counsel at the time
of drafting the settlement agreement.110 Taxpayer-plaintiffs
should be mindful that overly aggressive allocations may be
ignored by the IRS and the courts.
Taxpayer-plaintiffs should also be aware that the authority
on taxation of prejudgment interest war is favoring the IRS at
this point in time. They have won a clear victory in the Tenth
Circuit and at least temporary victories in the First and Sixth
Circuits. The small consolation afforded taxpayers in the First
Circuit is that the substantive issue was not confronted because
of some procedural problems and was specifically said to still be
alive. In the Sixth Circuit there was no written opinion in its
affirmance of the Tax Court decision in Kovacs. In fact, the closeness of the issue is demonstrated by the strong, lengthy and
multiple dissents in the Kovacs Tax Court decision which were
echoed by the district court judge in Brabson.
This is an issue where the government is likely to continue
to prevail absent Congressional intervention, which seems improbable, given all its attention to the subsection. The government is likely to prevail for several reasons.
First, initial circuit court decisions are favoring the government. As mentioned, the Tenth Circuit tackled the issue squarely and favorably for the government. That case even involved a
state prejudgment interest statute that was interpreted as being
compensatory in nature. The Sixth Circuit, while arguably ambiguous in its silence, came down against the taxpayers. Again,
the First Circuit has left the issue open but its decisions in
Delaney and Forest can hardly be considered pro-taxpayer decisions. On a difficult issue such as this it seems likely that other
circuits examining the issue will go along with initial precedents.
Obviously, this argument cannot ignore the willingness of the
other circuits to assert their independent conclusions, however.
Second, while a finding that state law deems prejudgment
interest to be compensatory in nature might make a stronger

110. See Brent B. Nicholas and Douglas K Chapman, Enforceability of Settlement
Agreement Allocations Under Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 47
BAYLOR L. REV. 97, 114-15 (1995).
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case for exclusion, such is not necessarily the case, as demonstrated in Brabson. Further, there are other functions served by
prejudgment interest that have nothing to do with compensating
plaintiffs. They include the encouragement of prompt settlements
and the removal from defendants of gains made with plaintiffs'
money. As pointed out by Professor Dobbs, interest on pain and
suffering has not, in fact, been considered compensatory because
of the lack of pecuniary loss.
Third, the policy behind the PPSA, often argued by taxpayers is, at best, ambiguous and, ultimately, unstated. Beyond a
desire to simply codify existing law there is no evidence Congress
was attempting to exempt the prejudgment interest component
of lump sum payments. Congress is deemed aware of the decisions in Kovacs and Brabson, which were rendered prior to its
amendment to §104(a)(2) in mid-1996. The taxpayers in both
cases argued that the PPSA supported exclusion and were rebuffed by their respective courts. By inference, Congress must
have supported those courts' interpretations since they did not
modify the Code provision to rectify them, despite making other
major changes to that very provision. The best that taxpayers
can say on this is that the courts' interpretations create an inconsistency of treatment between periodic and lump sum payments.
Fourth, the Supreme Court decision in Schleier, as applied
in O'Gilvie, does not seem to support exclusion. The second prong
of the Schleier test, payment "on account of' a personal injury,
apparently requires a stronger nexus than exists with prejudgment interest. In O'Gilvie, a majority of the Court rejected utilizing a simple "but for" test for this prong. Under such a test, the
punitive damages in that case probably would have been excluded. With prejudgment interest it seems more likely (never certain) that the interest would be perceived as being paid for the
lost time value of money, not directly for the personal injury
itself. Even Judge Halpern, who dissented in Kovacs, did not
believe prejudgment interest satisfied the second prong of the
Schleier test. It also may be more than coincidence that taxpayers have lost the last three cases involving §104(a)(2) in the High
Court.
Finally, the government has the powerful "default" rules on
its side. Specifically, these rules interpret income broadly and exclusions narrowly, as well as provide that IRS determinations of
taxation are presumptively correct and that the taxpayer has the
burden of disproving those determinations. On difficult issues
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/3
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with persuasive arguments on both sides like this, these rules
may decide the case. Arguably, it decided Brabson.
V.

CONCLUSION

While much has now been decided, either by congressional
action or Supreme Court adjudication, some issues surrounding
the exclusion from taxable income for amounts received on account of a personal injury or sickness remain. In fact, some new
issues have been created by the Small Business Job Protection
Act of 1996, such as whether sex discrimination cases based on
physical contact are excludable and what degree of nexus need
exist between the claim and physical injury. A second lingering
issue that has remained throughout the legislative and judicial
molding of §104(a)(2) is whether prejudgment interest is taxable
when paid as part of a personal injury.
Because of the general unavailability of prejudgment interest in personal injury cases historically, it has not been a tax
issue until the last several years. The Tax Court decision in
Kovacs in 1994 was the seminal case on the issue. That opinion,
favoring taxability, presaged the appellate decisions in Brabson,
Delaney and Forest. In this author's view, that trend is likely to
continue in any future cases. An often related and predicate
issue in these cases is the allocation of taxable and nontaxable
components, including interest, in lump sum settlement payments.
Ideally, Congress will legislate an answer to the question of
whether prejudgment interest on personal injury payments is
taxable. Such a resolution seems unlikely in the short term in
light of Congress' significant activity in §104(a)(2) in 1996. So,
for now, the taxability of prejudgment interest will remain in the
domain of the courts.
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